The United StatesвЂ™ nuclear C3I system is becomingВ increasingly reliant on dual-use assets, such as early-warning satellites used to detect an incoming nuclear attack and to cue defenses against nonnuclear ballistic missiles.

These changes include digitization, which creates the possibility of cyber interference, and, at least in the United States, decreased redundancy as a result of reduced funding.

Changes in the design of nuclear C3I systems have exacerbated this threat.

Developments in nonnuclear technology-including in cyberweapons, anti-satellite capabilities, and high-precision conventional munitions-are increasing the threat to C3I assets.

Because many of these assets are space based or distant from probable theaters of operation, their vulnerability and the implications of attacks on them have been generally overlooked by analysts.Д¬3I assets are becoming more entangled as a result of four technological and doctrinal trends: Entangled assets include satellites used for early warning, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ground-based radars and transmitters and communication aircraft. Nuclear C3I assets can be entangled with nonnuclear weapons in one or both of two ways: they can be dual use-that is, used to enable nonnuclear as well as nuclear operations-or vulnerable to nonnuclear attack. Entanglement also creates the risk of inadvertent escalation as a result of Chinese or Russian strikes on the United States-a possibility that has scarcely been considered since the end of the Cold War. nonnuclear strikes on Russia or China sparking inadvertent escalation-a danger that analysts have warned about over the past decade or so and that some military planners and civilian policymakers recognize. Such вЂњentanglementвЂќ exacerbates the risk of U.S. This risk is rising today as a result of technological developments that are increasing both the likelihood and effectiveness of nonnuclear attacks against key nuclear command, control, communications, and intelligence assets. These preparations should include greater efforts to manage the risk of such a conflict inadvertently escalating into a nuclear war. The United States military is increasingly focused on preparing for the possibility of a major conflict against China or Russia.

Department of Defense should ensure that inadvertent escalation risks are given due consideration within acquisitions, war planning, and crisis management. For the time being, unilateral measures offer the most promising approach to risk reduction. Such attacks could, however, spark inadvertent escalation that culminated in nuclear use. In a conventional conflict between the United States and China or Russia, either of the belligerents might launch nonnuclear attacks against its opponentвЂ™s dual-use C3I assets for the purpose of undermining that opponentвЂ™s nonnuclear operations. Moreover, they all use at least some dual-use assets that support both nuclear and nonnuclear operations. The nuclear command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I) systems of the United States, China, and Russia are becoming increasingly vulnerable to nonnuclear attack.

International missile commander